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BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION*
STEFAN

A.

RIESENFELD**

I. ScoPE AND NATURE OF THE TASK IN GENERAL

T

acceptance and growth of workmen's compensation as a
modem approach to the human and social losses resulting from
work-injuries' naturally create some very basic and crucial problems in the administration of the system. Administration is here
used in the widest sense of the word and comprises the basic elements of the benefit structure, the range of the beneficiaries, and
methods of claim determination, as well as the financing of the program and its coordination with other branches of our social security
system, and the legal framework at large.
The recognition that workmen's compensation is fundamentally
a branch of social insurance, designed to protect a segment of the
population against substandard living conditions brought about the
a typical hazard of modem society 2 furnishes, at the most, a very
vague guide for the actual design of a modem and, as it were,
ideal workmen's compensation program. The realities of the task
to be performed serve possibly as much more reliable guide posts
*This article constitutes the annotated form of the second of two lectures
which were given on Nov. 25th and 27th, 1950, at the University of Minne-

sota as the Gleason Lectures on Workmen's Compensation, sponsored by
NACCA. It is the slightly modified version of an article printed concurrently
in the NACCA Law Journal by arrangement with its editor. The first lecture, entitled Forty Years of American Workmen's Compensation, was printed in 35 Minn. L. Rev. 525 (1951).
**Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
1. For the history of the evolution of workmen's compensation in the
United States see Riesenfeld, Forty Years of American Workmen's Compensation. 7 NACCA L. J. 15 (1951) ; 35 Minn. L. Rev. 525 (1951).
2. For the development of this idea see Riesenfeld, Forty Years of
American Workmen's Compensation, 7 NACCA L. J. 15, 21 (1951) ; 35
Minn. L. Rev. 525, 530 (1951).
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toward the ultimate goal of a socially adequate and workable system. It is perhaps wise to aim high and think of workmen's compensation primarily in terms of adequate if not full social rehabilitation of the injured worker 3 rather than merely as "a compromise
in the public interest." 4
While the problems centering around the benefit structure and
effectuation of the benefit side are, in the nature of things, of paramount and preponderant importance, nevertheless ignoring the
financing and coordination angles would result in a grossly distorted picture if not serious impairment of the workability. The
facets of the problem of fashioning a modern workmen's compensation program are thus manifold and require studying a multitude
of practical and technical questions. Naturally the present paper
can only highlight the area and canvass the terrain cursorily. It
should be noted therefore that a more detailed exploration is aided
immeasurably not only by a few special studies regarding various
phases of the administration of workmen's compensation and a
multitude of reports by legislative and gubernatorial committees
for the improvement of the existing individual state laws" but especially by the proceedings and reports of the two associations formed
by the administrators of the two main operational aspects of the
program, viz., the International Association of Industrial Acci3. The idea that socially adequate (i.e., physical and economic) rehabilitation of the injured worker is the goal and function of workmen's compensation has been stressed by a number of students and practical administrators
of the program, see for instance recently Dawson, Present Conditions of
Workmen's Compensation Laws and Possible Changes, Proc. of the 36th
Annual Convention of the Int. Assoc. of Ind. Acc. Boards and Comm's.,
U. S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Stds., Bull. No. 142, at 61 (1950).
4. The idea of workmen's compensation as a "compromise" is unfortunately dear to many courts and even members of the administrative agencies,
see for instance Campbell, Basic Principles of Workmen's Compensation,
Proc. of the 36th Annual Convention of the Int. Assoc. of Ind. Acc. Boards
and Comm's., U. S. Dept of Labor, Bureau of Labor Stds., Bull. No. 142 at
120 (1950). However, the latter author correctly recognizes rehabilitation as
the purpose of the program, Id. at 129.
5. The chief relatively modern studies of the administration of Ameri-

can workmen's compensation are Dodd, Administration of Workmen's Com-

pensation (1936) and Dawson, Problems of Workmen's Compensation Administration, U. S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics Bull., No. 672
(1940). A more recent work centering primarily on the scope of coverage,
the benefit levels and the costs of the systems is Reede, Adequacy of Workmen's Compensation (1947). A comparatively detailed presentation of the
various problems of workmen's compensation is also contained in Riesenfeld and Maxwell, Modern Social Legislation 127-440 (1950).
6. The most comprehensive recent reports by legislative committees are
the Report of Senate Interim Committee to the Senate on Workmen's Compensation Benefits, 59th Sess., Calif. Legisl. (1949) and the (1st) Partial
Report of Senate Interim Committee to the Senate on Workmen's Compensation Benefits, Calif. Legisl. 1951 Reg. Sess. (1951).
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dent Boards and Commissions7 and the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners."
Speaking in the most general terms it should be noted that the
administration of workmen's compensation is characterized by two
outstanding properties which I like to designate, for lack of better
terms, with the labels standardization and de-technicalization. Al-

though the specific needs of an injured individual even for adequate
rather than full social rehabilitation might vary greatly in each
individual case and could be correctly determined only by a rather
refined process, it is obvious and an inexorable fact that the enormous workload of the system9 and the necessity for speedy action
compel a certain amount of typification and informality foreign
to the rather sophisticated standards of judicial administration in
tort cases. The true crux of the problem in drafting a modem
compensation act lies in the proper scope and degree of this standardization of benefits without sacrifice of the ultimate goal of
adequate rehabilitation and the proper extent of de-technicalization
without violation of the rudiments of fairness to which all parties
are rightfully entitled.
II. THE PROBLEM OF THE MEASURE OF BENEFITS
Undoubtedly the central problem in the administration of workmen's compensation (as defined in the previous section) is the
establishment of the proper standards for determining the measure
of benefits. This task is by no means easy or obvious. It depends
upon complicated problems of social policy and defies attempts
of easy generalization. Its intrinsic difficulties can be best understood by contrast with the accepted standards for the determination of the measure of redress in the law of torts.
The leading theme of the law of torts is the payment of money
damages. Leaving aside the outmoded notions of exemplary (punitive) and nominal damages-the idea of compensatory damages
proceeds on the basis that the injured party shall be fully relieved,
at least economically from the detrimental results of the tortious
conduct. In other words, the economic status of the victim shall
retain its level despite the interference by the tort-feasor. Theoreti7. The proceedings of the annual conventions of the association, excepting the first two (1914, 1915) and the thirtieth meeting (1944), are published in separate bulletins by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (1916-1933) and

the Bureau of Labor Standards (1934-1950).
8. The proceedings of the annual conventions of the association are

published in separate volumes beginning with the first meeting in 1870, but
not covering the 6th to the 18th meeting (1875-1887).
9. For statistics regarding disabling work-injuries in the United States
see the references cited in my previous lecture, 7 NACCA L. J. 15, 17 n. 17
(1951).
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cally all deleterious results expressable in monetary terms shall
be taken account of in the award.10 This includes not only palpable
monetary losses such as the expenses for medical treatment and
physical rehabilitation or the reduction of past and future earnings
(considering the whole lifespan, beginning with the tort and extending over the period to be expected without injury), but also
less tangible ill effects such as pain, suffering, shock, loss of standing
in the community, humilitation, mortification, etc. The translation
of the latter items into monetary figures is not always readily accomplished. Yet apparently social conventions are sufficiently crystallized to ascribe economic vadues to the freedom from such intangible and more sophisticated consequences. 1
The benefits payable under workmen's compensation are admittedly not designed to provide for full compensation of all injurious consequences of the injury expressable in monetary terms.
They merely aim at an alleviation of the deterioration in the living
standards of the victim and his family flowing from the injury.
They are as much predicated cn the idea of need as on the idea of
loss. 2 Thus compensation includes in general no amounts for pain,
suffering, humiliation and other social discomforts." The basis for
the computation of benefits in all American compensation laws is
an elusive and somewhat flexible concept called disability.'4 The
10. For a detailed and provocative study of the various considerations
to be presented by counsel in order to secure a proper recovery see Belli,
The Adequate Award, 39 Calif. L. Rev. 1 (1950).

11. The process of this crystallization is one of long standing in
Anglo-American law. As early as 1198 we find a complaint alleging that
plaintiff "received such a beating and bruises that he would not have wanted
to receive such ill treatment for 100 soldi." See the Latin original, quoted
in the introduction by Richardson and Sayles to Select Cases of Procedure
Without Writ under Henry III, 60 Selden Society, CIX (1941).
12. The difference between -the character of compensation payments
and money damages is not infrequently invoked by the courts. Occasionally
the judicial language is so emphatic that it seems to overshoot the mark.
Certainly workmen's compensation benefits are designed to relieve the workman from his more drastic losses, although they do not constitute full compensation for all losses and may, as in the case of dependents' allowances, not
in all respects depend on loss. But compare judicial comments such as the following: "Compensation is a concept wholly different from that of damages,"
Henrie v. Rocky Mountain Packirg Corp., 196 P. 2d 487, 493 (Utah 1948)
(modified in 202 P. 2d 727 (Utah 1949)).
13. See, for instance, Shaw v. Salt River Valley Users' Ass'n., 69 Ariz.
309, 311, 312, 213 P. 2d 378 (1950) : "There is no provision in the act which
allows compensation for pain and suffering. Therefore pain and suffering
which do not lessen the employee's ability to earn wages is not compensable."
Many states have, however, inserted into the compensation laws provisions for
"disfigurement" which in a few instances take account of the social inconveniences flowing therefrom although they do not manifest themselves
in reduction of employment opportunities. For details see Riesenfeld and
Maxwell, Modern Social Legislation 299, 300 (1950).
14. See Horovitz, The Meaning of "Disability" Under Wforkmen's
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courts of some jurisdictions have considered this concept in most
if not all cases as being practically equivalent with a reduction in
physical capacity, though sometimes they have seen fit to add a
few thoretical reservations.' 5 To that extent therefore disability
depends completely upon a purely nedical value judgment. But in
the preponderant majority of jurisdictions the term disability is
used in the sense of a reduction in earning capacity. It thus involves in the last analysis an economic value judgment, although
the extent of the underlying medical disability will constitute an
important but not solely controlling factor in arriving at the final
result. "' In most jurisdictions the extent of the disability alone does
not determine the amount to be received. Subject to stated floors
and ceilings, the benefits are computed as a percentage of the wage
received at the time of the injury. Only four of the western jurisdictions specify the amounts of benefits to be paid in flat sums' 7 or
percentages thereof, two of them,' however, with the qualification
that the flat benefit system applies only to the permanent disabilities.
In addition to granting death benefits the American benefit
formulae differentiate universally between various classes of disability depending upon the duration and degree thereof. Thus we
find separate provisions for permanent total disability, permanent
partial disability and temporary total disability. 19 A number of
20
states add a fourth class called temporary partial disability.
It is generally agreed that total disability does not require the
existence of a state of complete helplessness or incapacity for all
Compensation Jets, 1 NACCA L. J. 32 (1948).
15. The leading jurisdictions which emphasize the medical side (loss
of bodily functions) as the chief aspect of disability, at least in all permanent
disability cases, are New Jersey and Washington. The principal case responsible for that approach which is mostly due to statutory language was

Burbage v. Lee, 87 N. J. L. 36, 93 AtI. 859 (Sup. Ct. 1915). For recent

applications and, perhaps, qualifications see Cooper v. Cities Service Oil
Company, 137 N. J. L. 181, 184, 59 A. 2d 268 (1948), and Franks v. Department of Labor & Industries, 35 Wash. 2d 763, 215 P. 2d 416 (1950), see also
infra diote 34 and in general Riesenfeld and Maxwell, op. cit. supra note 13,
at 299.
16. As examples of the multitude of cases stressing the latter approach
see Zeigale's Case, 325 Mass. 128, 89 N. E. 2d 264 (1949) ; Enrico v. Oliver
Min. Co., 199 Minn. 190, 271 N. W. 456 (1937); Anderson v. Northwest
Motor Co., 233 N. C. 372, 64 S. E. 2d 265 (1951).
17. Alaska, Oregon, Washington and Wyoming, cf. State Workmen's
Compensation Laws, as of Sept. 1950, U. S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor
Stds. Bull. No. 125, at 11 (1950).
18. Alaska and Oregon.
19. See the survey in State Workmen's Compensation Laws, as of Sent.
1950. U. S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Stds., Bull. No. 125, at 11 (1950).
20. See, for instance, Cal. Labor Code § 4654 (Deering 1943); Md.
Code Ann. Art. 101 § 35(6) (Flack 1947) ; Minn. Stat. Ann. § 176.11 subd. 2;
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work.2 ' The courts deem sufficient for a finding of total disability
that the victim has suffered an injury which prevents him under'
normal conditions of the labor market to find any substantial and
steady gainful employment without subjecting himself to unreasonable danger or discomfort. 22 But most courts also insist on the
presence of all these conditions and refuse to find total disability
as long as the injured worker is still fit for light and menial work
of the type which is ordinarily sought by employers. -3 Accordingly,
mere incapacity to follow the customary occupation, i.e., the preinjury calling or a calling reasonably similar thereto, is not
considered as amounting to total disability 24 except in a few jurisdictions, especially Louisiana2 5 and Michigan, although even in the
latter state the general wage-earning capacity after the injury enters
as a set-off.

26

N. Y. Workmen's Compensation Law § 15(5), 64 McKinney's Cons. Laws
(Cum. Supp. 1951); Okla., Stat. Ann., Tit. 85 § 22(4) (Cum. Supp. 1951).
21. See, for instance, the statements to that effect in Endicott v. Potlatch Forests, 69 Idaho 450, 455, 208 P. 2d 803, 806 (1949) ; Pullman Co. v.
Industrial Com., 356 Ill. 43, 48, 189 N. E. 874, 876 (1934) ; Cornett-Lewis
Coal Co. v. Day, 312 Ky. 221, 225, 226 S. W. 2d 951, 953 (1950) ; Frennier's
Case, 318 Mass. 635, 639, 63 N. E. 2d 461, 463 (1945).
22. See, for instance, the holdings or dicta to that effect in National
Fuel Co. v. Arnold, 214 P. 2d 784 (Colo. 1950) ; Osterlund v. State, 135 Conn.
498, 66 A. 2d 363 (1949) ; Pullman Co. v. Industrial Com., 356 Ill. 43, 189
N. E. 874 (1934); Joilet & Eastern Traction Co. v. Industrial Com., 299
Ill. 517, 132 N. E. 794 (1921) ; Frennier's Case, 318 Mass. 635, 63 N. E. 2d
461 (1945) ; Lee v. Minneapolis Street Railway Co., 230 Minn. 315, 41 N. W.
2d 433 (1950) ; Colantonio v. Kingsbury Machine Tool Co., 79 A. 2d 633
(N.H. 1951); Cleland v. Verona Radio Inc., 130 N. J. L. 588, 33 A. 2d
712 (Sup. Ct. 1943) ; Dierks Lumber & Coal Co. v. Lindley, 182 Okla. *185,
77 P. 2d 44 (1938) ; Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co. v. Hardy, 179 Okla. 624,
67 P. 2d 445 (1937).
23. See, for instance, Clark v. Henry & Wright Mfg. Co., 136 Conn.
514, 72 A. 2d 489 (1950) (lack of earning capacity in other types of employment produced by slack in labor market). But cf. Czeplicki v. Fafnir
Bearing Co., 78 A. 2d 339 (Conn. 1951) ; Colantonio v. Kingsbury Machine
Tool Co., 79 A. 2d 633 (N.H. 1951) (denial of total disability because of
lack of conclusive evidence to the effect that claimant could not find other
types of light work) ; see also Leavor v. Midvale Co., 162 Pa. Super. 393,
57 A. 2d 698 (1948) (requirements satisfied by post-injury military record
of victim).
24. See the express statements to that effect in Osterlund v. State, 135
Conn. 498, 505, 66 A. 2d 363, 367 (1949) ; Congoleum Nairn v. Brown, 158
Md. 285, 148 Atl. 426 (1929). But cf. Gowe v. Davis Coal & Coke Co., 78 A.
2d 195 (Md. 1951) (different definition of disability under occupational disease law) ; Colantonio v. Kingsbury Machine Tool Co., 79 A. 2d 633 (N.H.
1951) ; Oklahoma Cas. & Electric Co. v. Hardy, 179 Okla. 624, 67 P. 2d 445
(1937); Leaver v. Midvale Co., 162 Pa. Super. 393, 398, 57 A. 2d 698, 701
(1948); Texas Employers' Insurance Association v. Mellard, 143 Tex. 77,
182 S. W. 2d 1000 (1944).
25. Hughes v. Enloe, 214 La. 539, 38 So. 2d 225 (1948) ; see Scott v.
Hillyer. Deutsch, Edward, 217 La. 595, 599, 46 So. 2d 914, 915 (1950).
26. MacDonald v. Great Lakes Steel Corp., (1st case), 268 Mich. 591,
594, 256 N. W. 558 (1934), (2 case), 274 Mich. 701, 265 N. W. 776 (1936) ;
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The measure of the degree of partial permanent disability as
well as the line of demarcation between partial and total permanent
disability has perplexed the courts and given rise to a mess of confusion and doubt. All but oneC7 of the 54 American workmen's
compensation acts contain more or less elaborate catalogues of
specified types of injuries and eliminate the necessity for a determination of the exact degree of disability flowing therefrom in
the individual cases by fixing the compensation to which these injuries entitle either by setting out flat amounts,2 s or (in the majority of jurisdictions) by prescribing the length of time for which
compensation computed as a stated percentage of the pre-jury wages
is payable.
The introduction of these schedule injuries was conceived as a
(perhaps arbitrary) standardization of the degree of disabilitywhether conceived as an economic or a medical concept 29-and was
designed to simplify and expedite the administration of the workmen's compensation laws. Experience has proven that these schedules are at best a mixed blessing. While in many instances they eliminate the necessity of determining the actual degree of disability
on the basis of complex and conflicting medical and economic evidence, their applicability in the individual case will frequently be
dubious and might as easily result in a hardship to the injured
Lynch.v. Briggs Mfg. Co., 329 Mich. 168, 45 N. W. 2d 20 (1950).

27. California does not possess a catalogue of schedule injuries but
fixes the benefits according to classes formed for percentages of permanent dis-

ability incurred, Cal. Labor Code § 4658 (Deering 1943). The Federal Civil
Employees' Compensation Act acquired its schedule in 1949, 5 U. S. C. A.
§ 755 (Cum. Supp. 1949).
28. Alaska, Vashington, Wyoming. Cf. supra text to notes 17 and 18.
29. The apparent "anomaly" of the schedule injuries has puzzled the
courts in practically all jurisdictions. The majority of them seems to have
considered the schedule injuries as more or less arbitrary legislative stand-

ardization of the degree of disability whether conceived as reduction of earning capacity or physical ability. For leading cases from various jurisdictions
struggling with the character of schedule injuries see Swift & Co. v. Industrial Com., 302 Ill. 38, 44, 134 N. E. 9, 11 (1922) ; In re Denton & Good,
65 Ind. App. 426, 437, 117 N. E. 520, 523 (1917) ; Washington v. Independent

Ice & Cold Storage Co., 211 La. 690, 30 So. 2d 758 (1947) ; Merchant's Case,
118 Me. 96, 99, 106 AtI. 117, 119 (1919) (arbitrary compensation); Clements v.
Chrysler Corp., 321 Mich. 558, 562, 33 N. W. 2d 82, 83 (1948); Everhart v.

Newark Cleaning & Dyeing Co., 119 N. J. L. 108, 111, 194 Atl. 294, 296

(1937) ; Marhoffer v. Marhoffer, 220 N. Y. 543, 548, 116 N. E. 379,380 (1917) ;
State ex rel, Dudley v. Industrial Com., 135 Ohio St. 121, 125, 19 N. E.

2d 895, 897 (1939) ; Mudge Oil Co. v. Wagnon, 193 Okla. 466, 145 P. 2d 185

(1943) ; Consolidated Underwriters v. Langley, 141 Tex. 78, 81, 170 S. W.

2d 463, 464 (1943) ; Beane v. Vermont Marble Co., 115 Vt. 142, 144, 52 A.
2d 784, 785 (1947) ; Franks v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 35 Wash. 2d 763,
773, 215 P. 2d 416, 424 (1950). In Massachusetts the specific compensation
under the schedule is merely "additional compensation," IV-A Mass. Stat
Ann., Ch. 152 § 36 (1950).
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workman as in an advantage.- The worst hardship cases produced
by the schedules occur especially in the instances-a) where the
loss of a member, such as a leg or an arm, hits a completely unskilled and uneducated laborer and thus results in total destruction
of his earning power, or b) where an injury which ordinarily is considered as of comparatively minor consequence destroys the use
of a member vital to the pursuit of a highly skilled profession, such
as is illustrated by the loss of the first phalange of the left index
finger by a violinist. Numerous courts have held to the position
that they are bound by the compensation set out in the schedules
in the cases to which they apply, and this apparently despite the
fact that the injury in the particular case*produces an unusually
high degree of partial or even total disability.3 1 Fortunately, however, to an increasing degree they tend to be inclined to alleviate
some of the harshest results by finding that the injury in question
goes beyond the particular schedule because it extends to zones
of the anatomy not included in the description of the schedule injury or affects the whole body otherwise than the injury envisaged
by the schedule.3 2 Also apart from these inequities here mentioned
the schedules have presented complicated questions of construction,
especially in the cases of simultaneous multiple injuries and additional temporary disabilities."
30. The "advantage" occurs frequently in the form that the injured
workman is considered as disabled although he actually suffers no peimanent
loss of earnings as a result of the injury, see cases collected in note 149
A. L. R. 413 at 449; and Horovitz, op. cit. supra note 14, at 35.
31. See, for instance, Kentucky Cardinal Coal Corp. v. Delph, 296 Ky.
295, 176 S.W. 2d 886 (1943) ; Consolidated Underwriters v. Langley, 141 Tex.
78, 170 S. W. 2d 463 (1943). Notable exceptions from the general rule are
Louisiana, New Hampshire, and apparently also Massachusetts and Tennessee. In Louisiana it has been held that the schedule applies only in the
absence of adverse effect on earnings, Scott v. Hillyer, Deutch, Edwards, 217
La. 597, 46 So. 2d 914 (1950). In New Hampshire the schedule is by statute
specifically declared to be merely elective, N. H. Laws 1947 c. 266 § 2511, see
also Bernier v. Mills, 93 N. H. 299, 41 A. 2d 221 (1945). In Massachuetts
the specific compensation for scl-edule injuries is according to the act only
"additional compensation" and dces not preclude compensation for total incapacity, Hummer's Case, 317 Mass. 617, 39 N. E. 2d 295 (1945). In Tennessee the Supreme Court, after prolonged vascillations, seems to have recently arrived at the conclusion that the provisions for total disability override the schedule, Johnson v. Anderson, 188 Tenn. 194, 217 S. W. 2d 939
(1949), see also Cox v. Black Diamond Coal Mining Co., 93 F. Supp. 685
(E.D. Tenn. 1950), noted 7 NACCA L. J. 103 (1951).
32. Illustrative cases for this rule are Wood Mosaic Co. v. Brown, 303
Ky. 741, 199 S.W. 2d 433 (1947) ; Olson v. Griffin Wheel Co., 218 Minn. 48,
15 N. W. 2d 511 (1949) ; Consolidated Underwriters v. Langley, 141 Tex.
78, 170 S. W. 2d 463 (1947). For further references see Horovitz, op. cit.
supra note 14, at 37; Riesenfeld & Maxwell, op. cit. supra note 13 ,at 307.
33. The different jurisdictions show great variation as to the limits
within which "pyramiding" of injuries and taclqng of benefit periods are
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In all other cases of permanent partial disability, that is where
the schedules apply neither directly nor as standards of comparison,
the courts have likewise been faced with extraordinarily difficult
questions. Since in these cases, according to the majority of statutes,3 4 the actual reduction of the earning capacity is the criterion
which determines the degree of disability, the problem is solved
neither by ascertaining the degree of medical disability3" nor by
simply comparing pre-injury and post-injury wages. It is apparently generally recognized that the amount of wages actually received after the injury is by no means conclusive of the earning
capacity actually subsisting, since the amount may be based on
other considerations than the value of services of the injured employee on the regular labor market.:6 Even where the post-injury
wages are the same as are paid for services of that type on the open
labor market, the correct comparisons of the pre- and post-injury
earning capacities may properly necessitate complicated wage level
adjustments.17 There exists, however, wide disagreement, how far
other factors, especially age, should be weighted in determining
permissible. For illustrative cases relating to multiple injuries see Tennessee
Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Long, 251 Ala. 492, 38 So. 2d 18 (1948) ; Lysowsky
v: White, 177 Md. 377, 9 A. 2d 599 (1949) ; Hanson v. Hayes, 225 Minn. 48,
29 N. W. 2d 437 (1947) ; Cooper v. Cities Service Oil Co., 137 N. L. J. 181,
59 A. 2d 268 (1948) ; Matter of Sokolowski v. Bank of America, 261 N. Y. 61,
184 N. E. 492 (1933); Barlock v. Orient Coal & Coke Co., 319 Pa. 119,
178 Atl. 840 (1935); Griffith v. Goforth, 184 Tenn. 56, 195 S. W. 2d 33
(1946). For a well considered case relating to tacking of benefits for temporary total and permanent partial disability, see Peerless Sales Co. v.
Industrial Com., 107 Utah 419, 154 P. 2d 644 (1944).
34. There is a steady growth of the area of cases involving permanent
partial disability in which the compensability is determined not by determination of the actual reduction of the earning capacity, but by comparison of the
medical severity of the injury with related schedule injuries or injuries producing total disability, see especially Clark's Case, 120 Me. 133, 113 Atl. 51
(1921) ; E. I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Spencer, 195 Okla. 300, 157 P. 2d
186 (1945) ; Silver King Coalition Mines Co. v. Industrial Comm. of Utah, 92
Utah 511, 69 P. 2d 608 (1937) ; Beane v. Vermont Marble Co., 115 Vt. 142,
52 A. 2d 784 (1947) ; Northern States Power Co. v. Industrial Com., 252 Wis.
70, 31 N. W. 2d 217 (1947). This approaches, of course, the New Jersey
and Washington system, as exemplified by Everhart v. Newark Cleaning
and Dyeing Co., 119 N. J. L. 108, 194 Atl. 294 (1937) and Franks v. Dept.
of Labor & Industries, 35 Wash. 2d 763, 215 P. 2d 416 (1950), supra text to
note 15.
35. Standard Acc. Insurance Co. v. Industrial Commission, 66 Ariz.
247, 186 P. 2d 951 (1948) ; Enrico v. Oliver Iron Min. Co., 199 Minn. 190,
271 N. W. 456 (1937).
36. See, for instance, Davis v. Brenn & Co., 170 Kan. 177, 223 P. 2d
958 (1950), noted 7 NACCA L. J. 105 (1951); Sporcic v. Swift & Co.,
149 Neb. 246, 30 N. W. 2d 891 (1948). See also Riesenfeld & Maxwell, op.
cit. supra note 13, at 303, 304.
37. See, for instance, Whyte v. Industrial Com., 227 P. 2d 230 (Ariz.
1951), noted 7 NACCA L. 3. 106 (1951) ; Franklin County Coal Corp. v.
Industrial Commission, 398 Ill. 528, 76 N. E. 2d 457 (1947).
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the degree of the disability.38 Some states have special provisions
in that respect. 8
Yet, even after all the proper adjustments, the resulting
benefit levels payable under the workmen's compensation acts may
still engender grave inequities. Since most states compute the benefits ultimately as a specified percentage of the pre-injury wages, the
system discriminates severely against the young worker who, of
course, ordinarily will receive lower wages than his more experienced elders. As a result he will be compensated at a lower sum
despite the fact that actually both his loss and his wants may be
greater than those of the older worker. For the disabled young
worker faces a whole life of lower earning capacity and his children may still be small and in need of care. It was precisely this
social inconsistency which prompted some American labor leaders
in the early days to object to workmen's compensation."
To alleviate some of these hardships which result especially for
the younger worker from the existence of dependent children an
increasing number of states have made provisions for additional
disability benefits where there are such children involved. 41 In addition Massachusetts, Ohio and Utah, for instance, have also provided for a special rule in determining the basic wage of a young
worker which permits to consider the fact that his wages are expected to increase under natural conditions in view of his age and
experience. 42 But this authorization, beneficial as it could be, has
unfortunately been given a very limited applicability. In Massachusetts it has been held to apply only to such wage increases as
"might be expected from the particular employer in conducting
38. For an excellent discussion of the effect of age on disability ratings
and of the divergent views on the subject see (lst) Partial Report of Senate
Interim Committee to the Senata on Workmen's Compensation B,'nefits,
Calif. Legisl. 1951 Reg. Sess., 107 (1951).
39. See, for instance, Ariz. Code Ann. § 56-957(d) (1939) ; Md. Code
Ann. Art. 101 § 35(4) (Flack. Supp. 1947), as amended by Md. Laws
1951 c. 451. Wisconsin provides specifically for a reduction of the amounts
recoverable for permanent partial disability as a result of increasing age,
Wis. Stat., § 102A4(3) (b) and § 102.53(2) (1949).
40. See the letter of July 28, 1910, by W. S. Carter, President of the
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen to Edwin Wright,
President of the Illinois State Federation of Labor, reprinted in Report of the
Employer's Liability Commission of the State of Illinois 225 (1910).
41. For a survey of the jurisdictions which granted dependents' allowances in disability cases as of Sept. 1950, see State Workmen's Compensation
Laws, U. S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Stds., Bull. No. 125 at 29

(1950).
42. IV-A Mass. Laws Ann. Ch. 152 § 51 (1949); Ohio Code Ann.
§ 1465-85 (Throckmorton 1948) ; Utah Code Ann. § 42-1-71 (1943).
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his industry 'under natural conditions.' ,,4The statute thus construed does not compensate the young worker for the loss of
definite earning opportunities in a profession other than that in
which he suffered the loss. The tremendous hardships which might
flow from this limitation can be seen from a case which recently
came to the attention of the writer. A gifted young violin student
in a great state university suffered an injury to the first phalange of
the index finger while working in a factory to earn some money to
finance his lessons. Apparently the foreman was negligent. The injury
completely wrecked the promising professional career of the young
man. His total compensation was in the neighborhood of $300! Of
course, the argument presents itself immediately that industry should
not be responsible for extraordinary individual losses of the workers. 14 Yet in a tort action such losses would undoubtedly be considered
in the computation of the damages. Should not the definite loss of
job opportunities in general at least be a factor in the computation
of the worker's benefits despite the necessity for standardization of
the risk imposed on industry?
The above mentioned Massachusetts statute likewise does not
alleviate the intrinsic shortcomings from which a system that
predicates benefits upon past earnings at a fixed date and operates
with fixed amounts and specified ceilings is bound to suffer in a
period of steadily rising price and wage levels.45 A recent study
of the operation of state workmen's compensation acts made with
the view of a possible adoption of such system for railroad employees has conceeded that the benefit schedules now in general
use for permanent partial disabilities are "arbitrary, inconsistentand often inadequate." 10 Other and more hostile critics have emphasi-ed in even stronger terms the illusory nature of the presently
47
existing protection in severe cases.
There is without doubt much truth in these statements.4 8 It is
43. Gagnon's Case, 228 Mass. 334, 338, 117 N. E. 321, 323 (1917);
but see the intimation of a broader scope of applicability for the Utah statute
in Justice Wolfe's concurring opinion in Royal Canning Corp. v. Industrial
Com., 101 Utah. 323, 334. 121 P. 2d 406. 411 (1942).
44. See the reasoning of Chief Justice Rugg in Gagnon's Case, supra
note 43.
45. Bursey's Case, 325 Mass. 702, 92 N. E. 2d 583 (1950).
46. Pollack, Vorkmen's Compensation for Railroad Work Injuries
and Diseases, 36 Cornell L. Q. 236, 267 (1951).
47. See, for instance, Richter and Forer, Fcderal Employers' Liability
lct-A Real Comnpensator , Law for Railroad Workers, 36 Cornell L. Q.
203 (1951).
48. The Federal Security Agency, in surveying the benefit payments
under state workmen's compensation acts, found in 1950 that the ceilings
on the weekly benefit amounts prevented the majority of workers in most
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significant that since the original adoption of the compensation
acts no detailed legislative investigations into the actualities of the
benefit levels have been made that could compare with the care
the fact finding committees which studied the operation of the
common law system in the field of industrial accidents forty years
ago. In the opinion of the writer it is high time that the legislatures
investigate the fate of the families in which the breadwinner has
suffered a permanent disability and study the possibility of benefit
formulae which are consistent, not overstandardized, and flexible
enough to be and remain socially adequate.
III. PROBLEMS IN CLAIM ADMINISTRATION

While the law relating to the structure and level of benefits
shows the distressing signs of legislative lethargy and patching
and repatching, the picture of the claim administration is much more
encouraging.
Originally a number of the American states followed the English
example 9 and provided for the settlement of compensation claims
either by arbitration subject to an extensive control by the courts,"
or by out and out "court administration." 5' 1 In the course of time
this method of adjudicating claims was abandoned as unsuitable

-

states from getting the statutory standard percentage of their weekly wages.
McCamman, Workmen's Compensation: Coverage, Premiums, Payments, 13
Social Security Bull., No. 7 at 3 (1950). The Illinois Industrial Commission demonstrated the inadequacy of the Illinois compensation benefits
at the 1949 level by comparing the benefits actually paid for various types
of injuries with the corresponding "standard economic time charges" allocated
to such injuries by the Bureau of Labor Statistics with the approval of the
American Standards Association. The following table resulted:
Extent of disability

All cases closed
Fatal
Permanent Total
Permanent Partial
Disfigurement
Temporary Total
Temporary Partial

Average Compensation
per day lost or charged
$1.28
.66
1.15
1.37
1.02
2.45
2.74

Ill. Industrial Commission, Annual Report on Industrial Accidents in
Illinois During 1949, Pt. II, 15 (1950). See also the tables infra note 73.
49. 6 Edw. 7, c. 58 § 1(3) and 2d Schedule (1906).
50. E.g., Ill. Law 1911, 315 §§ 10 if; Kan. Laws 1911 c. 218 §§ 24 ff.
51. Minn. Gen. Stats. 1913 § 8225; Neb. Laws 1913 c. 198 §§ 37 if;
N. J. Laws 1911 c. 95 §§ 18 ff.
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for the purpose5 2 and most states today entrust the administration
of the acts, including the determination of contested claims to
special administrative agencies.5 3
These agencies were at first separate boards, frequently called
Industrial Accident Boards.5 4 Since, however, the workmen's
compensation acts belong to that group of statutes which were
passed in the interest and for the protection of labor a number
of states followed a proposal conceived and developed by John R.
Commons of Wisconsin and created special "Industrial Commissions" for the integrated administration of all these laws, including
workmen's compensation. 55 Gradually, however, with the increased
governmental intervention in the field of labor relations, the preference for the commission form of the state department administering
industrial legislation underwent an eclipse and many of the states
of industrial importance reconstructed their labor departments along
different organizational charts.5 This reorganization naturally
has had its repercussion on the allocation of, and responsibility for,
the administration of the various functions and tasks to be per57
formed under the workmen's compensation acts.
At any rate, most states entrust the final adjudication of controverted compensation claims to a special board or commission"8 which
52. For the history of the abandonment of court administration in
Kansas, Minnesota, Nebraska and New Jersey see Dodd, Administration of
Workmen's Compensation (1936) 70 ff. Among the pioneer states which
created Industrial Accident Boards for the administeration of their acts
were California, Cal. Stats. 1911 c. 399 §12; Massachusetts, Mass. Acts 1911
c. 751 pt. III; and Wisconsin, Wis. Laws 1911 c. 50.
53. Today only five states have retained court administration, viz.
Ala., La., N. M., Tenn., and Wyo. Usually special rules of practice apply.
See Riesenfeld & Mavxwell, op. cit. supra note 13, at 337.
54. Industrial Accident Boards were created in the original acts of
California, Massachusetts and Wisconsin. Illinois established an Industrial
Board in its (second) workmen's compensation act of 1913.
55. For details and further references, see Riesenfeld & Maxwell, op.
cit. supra note 13, at 337. See also Altmeyer, The Industrial Commissions of
Wisconsin. 17 U. of Wis. Studies in Soc. Sci. and Hist. (1932).
56. For illustrative references see Riesenfeld & Maxwell, op. cit. supra
note 13, at 338.
57. For the reorganization in California and New York see Corten,
Experiences in Reorganizing a Workmen's Compensation Commission, in
Proc. of the 1946 Convention of the Int. Ass'n of Industrial Accident Boards
and Commissions. U. S. Dep't of Labor, Div. of Labor Stds., Bull. No. 87
at 83 (1947) ; Donlon, Reorganization of Workmen's Compensation Administration in New York, ibid. at 87.
58. A few states entrust the final administrative determination of workmen's compensation claims to single officials, see for instance Iowa Code, §
86.24 (1950) (final adbinistrative decision by Industrial Commissioner) ; N.
J. Stat. Ann. § 34:15-49 and § 34:1A-11 (Cum. Supp. 1950) (decision by
Division of Workmen's Compensation in the Department of Labor) ; N. H.
Laws 1949 c. 277 § 1 (decision by Commissioner of Labor) ; R. I. Gen Laws
1938 c. 300 Art. III, Acts 1941 c. 1064 § 150 (decision by Director of Labor).
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:-:while frequently affiliated in some fashion with the state "labor department"-posess the independence requisite for an administrative tribunal and whose decisions are subject to a limited judicial
review by th'courts (in many instances the court of last resort)
according to the 'geieral principles of administrative law.'1 In a
few states, however, the agency adjudication of compensation controversies does not possess this customary finality given to administrative findings, but can be upset by a more or less complete trial
de novo at the judicial stage." Notable examples of the latter system
are Nebraska,6 1 New Hampshire, 62 New Jersey,G3 Oregon,"4 Rhode

Island," and Texas.a6 It is, however, more than doubtful whether
6
such duplication serves any useful purpose.

7

Experience has shown that approximately 90% of all workmen's compensation claims do not reach a contested stage."1 For the
handling and supervision of the compensation cases prior to any
dispute adminifstit'ive experience has devised three prototypes
of approaches ialfe the He.aring System, the Voluntary Agreement System and" ee ~rect "PaymentSystem.60 Each system has
its followers among the states 70 and each has its virtues and dis-

advantages, although apparently the agreement system is now somewhat on the defense.71 Under the hearing system cases appearing
59. For the proper scope of judicial review of administrative action in
general see Davis, Admniistrative Law 868 ff. (1951).
60. For details see Dodd, op. cit. s-upra note 49, at 358 ff.

61.. Neb, Rev. Stat. 1943 § 48-181 (trial in equity).

62. N. H. Laws 1949 c. 277 § 1 ("full trial" without jury).
63. N. J. Stat. Ann. § 34:15-66 (trial de novo limited to record).
64. Ore. Comp. Laws § 102-1774 (Cum. Supp. 1947) (jury trial if
requested).
65. R. I. Gen. Laws 1938 c. 300 Art. III § 6 (summary trial without

jury).

66. Tex. Rev. Stat. Art. 8317 § 8307a (Vern. 1948) (full jury trial).
67. In recognition of the wastefulness of the existing system, the Governors of New Jersey and Rhode Island recommended to their 1951 legislatures the abolition of the review by trial de novo and the creation of
administrative appeal tribunals in lieu thereof.
68. See Riesenfeld & Maxwell, op. cit. mnpra note 13, at 349.
69. For a more detailed description of the operation of these systems
see Dodd, op. cit. supra note 49, at 135 ff; Dawson, Problems of Workmen's
Compensation in the United States and Canada, U. S. Dep't of Labor, Bureau
of Labor Statistics, Bull. No. 672 at 117 ff. (1940) ; Riesenfeld & Maxwell,
op. cit. supra note 13, at 348 ff (with further references).
70. The hearing system exists in New York. Representative states
for the agreement system (which prevails in about one-half of the American
jurisdictions) are Pennsylvania and North Carolina. The prompt payment
system is followed in the remaining jurisdictions, for instance in California,
Michigan, Minnesota and Wisconsin.
71. For evaluations of the various systems see especially Burczyk, Advantages and Disadvantages of the Agreement System, Especially in Relation to Prompt and Full Payment of Compensation, Proc. of 1946 Convention
of the Intern'l Ass'n of Ind. Acc. Bds. and Com's, U. S. Dept. of Labor.
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to be compensable after a preliminary sifting procedure, are automatically placed on a hearing calendar and thus the injured worker
is given a specific opportunity for an administrative review, of his
rights.7 2 Under the voluntary agreement system the insurance
carrier must conclude a formal agreement with the injured worker
even where there is no dispute and submit it to the agency for
approval. The prompt payment system emphasizes the need for
speedy action. It dispenses therefore with initial formalities in
undisputed cases and exercises supervision of the payments by
requiring certain notices.
The greatest shortcomings of the present workmen's compensation procedure appear, of course, in the contested cases. The
cases involve, as is to be expected, especially controversies in which
substantial amounts for medical costs and indemnity benefits are
in issue, i.e., injuries resulting in permanent total or major partial
disability.7 1 In proceedings of that type the extent of the disability
Div. of Labor Stds., Bull. No. 87 at 127 (1947) ; Allie, Michigan's Experience Under the Direct Payment Plan in Workmen's Compensation, ibid.
130; Wilson, Effect of the Agreement System on Promptness of Compensation Payments, ibid. 134.
72. During the year 1950 the number of accidents reported for the
entire state of New York totaled 786,768 cases. Out of this number 181,319
were indexed for hearing by the Claims Bureau of the Workmen's Compensation Board and transferred to the Referee Bureau; see N. Y. Workmen's Compensation Board, Ann. Rep. 1950, 6 (1951). It is interesting
to note that during that same year only 390 cases reached the Appellate
Division of the Supreme Court on appeal, ibid. at 10.
73. The following tables taken from N. Y. Workmen's Compensation
Board, Compensated Cases Closed in 1948, p. 37 (Res. & Stat. Bull. No.
6-1950), and Ill. Dept of Labor, Ann. Rep. on Industrial Accidents in
Illinois, Pt. II: Compensation Cases Closed in 1949, p. 13 (1951)
may illustrate the relation between frequency, cost and average case cost
of the various type of disabilitv. ILLINOIS 1949
Types of Disability
No. of Cases
All Types .....................
40,421
Fatal .......................
361
Permanent total ............
29
Permanent partial ........ 16,100
Disfigurement ........ .. 2,061
Temporary total ........ 21,851
Temporary partial ......
20

Tvhes of Disability
All types .....
.....
Fatal ..............
Permanent total ..........
Permanent partial ......
Temporary ...................

Tot. Comp. Cost. Average Case Cost
14,251,565
353
1,429,916
3,972
199,691
6,886
10,814,309
672
272,065
132
1,532,296
70
3.294
165

NEw YORK 1949
No. of Cases
Tot. Comi. Cost
112,389
976
323
38,353
72,737

67,956,369
8,616,473
6,580,913
39,735,382
13,023,601

Average Case Cost
605
8,828
20,374
1,036
179-
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resulting from, and attributable to, the accident is often the center
of the dispute and presents in consequence the vexed question of
disability rating. Not only, as has been pointed out, are the factual
bases of the statutory benefit formulae frequently inconsistent or
uncertain, but the methors of ascertaining them in the individual
cases are costly and haphazard. One of the recognized leaders in
the field of occupational medicine has voiced the following evalua4
tion of the present state of practice':7
"The most common type of system of rating disability . . . is

not disability rating but a tournament. It isn't a decision to the
individual's working capacity or loss of working capacity, but
a victory or defeat in a medical-legal tournament."
This battle by teams of medical and legal 7' experts is not only
demoralizing, time consuming and expensive 0 but produces of
course unavoidable discrepancy and incongruity in the awards and
in consequence thereof dissatisfaction among the injured.
But the diagnosis of an ailment does not necessarily furnish
the key to a prescription for its cure. Thus a variety of approaches
to a solution of the problem of disability rating have been suggested
7
A number of states have taken definite steps to allevior adoptedY.
ate the situation. In Minnesota the Rules of Practice issued by the
Industrial Commission limit the number of medical witnesses whom
a party may call and the hearing officer is authorized to appoint a
neutral physician to examine the employee for the effects of the acci74. Kessler, Rehabilitation and Disability Rating, Proc. 1946 Convention of the Int. Ass'n of Ind. Acc. Bds. & Comm's, U. S. Dep't of Labor,
Div. of Labor Stds., Bull. No. 87, 54 at 60 (1947).
75. Statistics indicate that claimants employ legal counsel primarily in
death, permanent total and permanent partial disability cases. Thus in New
York in 1948 45.1% of the death cases, 42.4% of the permanent total and
14.0% of the permanent partial disability cases were conducted with legal

assistance, N. Y. Workmen's Compensation Board, Compensated Cases in
1948, p. 27 (1950).
76. About the possible effect of the medical controversies on the injured worker himself see Dawson, Problems of Workmen's Compensation
Administration, U. S. Dep't of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics Bull.,
No. 672 at 127 (1940).
77. See especially Kessler, Rehabilitation and Disability Rating, Proc.

of the 1946 Convention of the IAIABC, U. S. Dept. of Labor, Div. of
Labor Stds., Bull. No. 87 at 45 (1947) ; Globe, Medical Problems in Workmen's Compensation, ibid. 64; Daily, Medical Aspects of Workmen's Compensation, ibid. 70; Duncan, A Code of Ethics for Workmen's Compensation
Medical Practitioners, ibid. 73; Pingree, A Code of Ethics for Workmen's
Compensation Medical Practitioners, ibid. 77; Hudson, Evaluation of Dis-

abilities, Proc. 1948 Convention of the IAIABC, U. S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau
of Labor Stds., Bull. No. 105 at 225 (1949).
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dental injury or occupational disease.7 8 In Arizona the commission
enjoys the services of a special medical referee and in addition resorts
frequently to Medical Advisory Boards for rating purposes." In
California the Industrial Accident Commission maintains a Medical
Bureau and in addition thereto a special Permanent Disability
Rating Bureau. The latter, in consultation with the Medical Bureau,
advises the hearing officer as to the percentage of permanent disability incurred. 0 Furthermore, the statute vests the commission
with the power to adopt a schedule for the determination of the percentages of permanent disabilities incurred. 8 ' In other states, as
for instance New York, the compensation agencies have likewise
developed and published special rating standards.8 2 While these
experiments apparently have not been completely successful, they
seem nevertheless to indicate that the scientific development of
standard rating procedures to be applied in their medical and occupational aspects by disinterested medical experts in consultation
with the attending physician seems to be the most promising approach to the problem.
Another defect in the handling of contested claims is the reluctance of the courts to free the commissions completely from the
traditional rules which restrict the admissibility or confine the intrinsic probative value of certain evidence. Even in the most progressive states terms like "competent" evidence or "mere" hearsay
linger on in the opinions and obscure the fact that all evidence
78. Rules of Practice Before Industrial Commission in Workmen's
Compensation Cases, Rules 12 and 13 reprinted in Minn. Stat. Ann. subsequent to § 176.81 (1949).
79. The Supreme Court of Arizona has approved the practice of establishing the functional disability in such way, although the resulting legal
disability in the proper cases must be found separately, see Hoffman v.
Brophy, 61 Ariz. 307, 149 P. 2d 160 (1944); Shaw v. Salt River Valley
Water Users' Ass'n, 69 Ariz. 309, 213 P. 2d 378 (1950) ; Eagle Indemnity
Co. v. Hadley, 70 Ariz. 179, 218 P. 2d 488 (1950).
80. Cf. Hanna, Industrial Accident Commission Practice and Procedure,
82 ff. (1943). For details regarding the California Rating Plan see (1st)
Partial Report of Senate Interim Committee to the Senate on Workmen's
Compensation Benefits, Calif. Legisl., 1951 Reg. Sess. 101 (1951).
81. The authority to adopt and publish such schedules was granted by
Labor Code § 4660. However, the adoption of a new rating schedule in 1950
resulting in an increase of benefits prompted an investigation by the Senate
Interim Committee on Workmen's Compensation Benefits which recommended
the curtailment of the power to increase benefits, (2d) Partial Report of
May 11, 1951, at p. 6. The legislature, however, left the commission vested
with the power to adopt such rating schedules and merely specified their
prospective applicability, Cal. Stats. and Amendments to the Codes 1951 c.
1683. For a discussion of the history of the schedule and the amendments
see (Ist) Partial Report of the Senate Interim Committee to the Senate
Workmen's Compensation Benefits, Calif. Legisl., 1951 Reg. Sess. 55 (1951).
82. See Riesenfeld & Maxwell, op. cit. supra note 13, at 293.
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which by reasonable standards may have probative value should
not only be admissible but also serve to support a finding. 3
Perhaps the most needed and at the same time the most promising improvement in the administration of workmen's compensation
is its extension to, and coordination with, the rapidly developing
field of rehabilitation. While a growing federal-state cooperative
program for vocational rehabilitation has existed since the passage
of the federal Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 19204 the coordination of the programs established thereunder with workmen's compensation has been slow. Gradually, however, a number of states
have inserted greatly varying special provisions into their compensation acts tending to provide financial support for, and administrative supervision of, the rehabilitation of the injured worker.,,
In 1950 the movement for the coalescence of workmen's compensation and rehabilitation gained further momentum with the holding
of a National Conference on Workmen's Compensation and Rehabilitation, sponsored 'by the Federal Security Agency and the
Department of Labor.86 As a result the International Association
of Industrial Accident Boards and Commissions adopted recently
a careful reportsr which contained suggestions for 1) provisions
allocating the costs of expenses and maintenance during rehabilitation, 2) a revision of the disability rating bases so as to facilitate
rehabilitation, 3) administrative techniques for an early diagnosis
and referral of rehabilitation cases, 8 4) improvement of the cooperation between the various government agencies in charge of
rehabilitation services.8 9
83. For details see Riesenfeld & Maxwell, op. cit. supranote 13, at 356 ff.
84. 29 U. S. C. A. §§ 31 ff. For the present status of the program see
Federal Security Agency, Annual Report 1950, 279 ff.
85. See, for instance, Ariz. Code Ann. § 56-955 (Cum. Supp. 1949)
Mass. Ann. Laws c. 152 § 30B (Cum.Supp. 1950) ; Minn. Stat. Ann. § 176.11
(1946); Miss. Code Ann. § 6998-10 (Cum.Supp. 1950); N. J. Stat. Ann.

§ 34:15-12(b) (Cum. Supp. 1950); N. Y. Workmen's Compensation Law
§ 15(9), 64 McKinnye's Cons. Laws (Cum. Supp. 1951) ; Ohio Code §
1456-80 (Throckmorton 1948) ; Ore. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 102-1501 ff. (1940) ;
Utah Code Ann. §§ 42-1-63 (Cum.Supp. 1951); Va. Code Ann. §§ 65-129 ff.
(Michie 1949) ; Wis. Stats. § 102.61 (1949).
86. See Proceedings of the National Conference on Workmen's Compensation and Rehabilitation, U. S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Stds.,
Bull. No. 122 (1950).
87. For the text see Proc. of the 36th Ann. Convention of the Int.
Ass'n of Ind. Acc. Bds. and Corn's, U. S. Dep't of Labor, Bureau of Labor
Stds., Bull. No. 142 at 166 (1950).
88. For the description of an interesting pilot study on early referral
procedures see N. Y. Workmen's Compensation Board, Ann. Rep. 1950, at 2.
89. On the last item see also Bohlin, Cooperative Relationships Between
Rehabilitation and Workmen's Compensation Administrators, Proc. of the
36th Ann. Convention of the Int. Ass'n of Ind. Acc. Bds. & Com's, U. S.
Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Stds., Bull. No. 142 (1950).
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PROBLEMS IN FINANCING WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION

Workmen's compensation is the financial responsibility of industry. But the methods of discharging this burden vary in the
different jurisdictions. When workmen's compensation was introduced in the United States the American legislators looked abroad
for models, especially to England and Germany. In England the
original law imposed the compensation liability upon the employer
and left it to his judgment whether or not to protect himself by
private insurance. In Germany the employers in different classes
of businesses were compelled to form and finance special professional organizations called Berufsgenossenschaften 9 as carriers of
the workmen's compensation liability. Eight of the American jurisdictions adopted a modified German system and set up a special
state compensation fund to which all covered employers in the
state are under a duty to subscribe (so-called monopolistic state
fund system)." Other jurisdictions adopted the English system
but modified it either from the beginning or subsequently by compelling the employer to insure his liability with a private carrier.
The remaining eleven jurisdictions finally chose a middle road
by establishing state funds but leaving the employers the option of
whether to subscribe to them or to insure with a private carrier (socalled competitive state fund system) .92
Even where workmen's compensation insurance is written by
private carriers the insurance rates and the terms of the policy
are subject to state control. Actually the rates are fixed annually
3
by a procedure which has become fairly standardized.9
It is obvious that the most fundamental and most hotly debated
question in the field of workmen's compensation financing is the
issue of (monopolistic) State Fund v. Private Insurance.14 The
heart of this problem, i.e., whether the field of social insurance
should be considered as a legitimate field for private enterprise,
is, of course, to a large extent of a political character. A correct
appraisal of all of its aspects, however, requires an answer to the
90. At present the West German industrial and agricultural employees
are organized in 51 such Berufsgenossenschaffen for the purpose of carrying
the compensation load. For a list see Wirtschaft und Statistik, N. S. 922
(1951).
91. It exists today in Nev., N. D., Ohio, Ore., Puerto Rico, W. Va.,
Wash., and Wyo.
92. Ariz., Cal., Colo., Idaho, Md., Mich., Mont.. N. Y., Okla., Pa., and

Utah.

93. For details and references regarding the standard rating procedure,
see Riesenfeld & Maxwell. op. cit. supra note 13, at 375-381.
94. See the references cited in Riesenfeld & Maxwell, op. cit. s, pra
note 13, at 368.
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further and more concrete question of whether private insurance
renders the necessary services efficiently, i.e., promptly, adequately
and at a reasonable cost to the employers.
While labor's criticism is primarily directed against unjustified
attempts by private carriers to defeat legitimate claims," the employers' interest focuses primarily on the costs side of the picture,
i.e., the efficiency of the rating process. On that score complaints
have become recently more and more vociferous.
Rate making for compensation insurance today is a highly technical art, if not a science. 96 The basic principles and various steps
to be performed are largely standardized and generally followed
by the state authorities in the annual rate revisions. The methods
have changed from time to time and undergone alternative periods
of refinement and simplification. The modern techniques are largely
the product of a prolonged 7 and close cooperation between the
rating authorities represented by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners and the industry represented by a special
technical organization formed for that purpose, the National
Council on Workmen's Compensation. 8
Generally it should be noted that the various types of operations occurring in modern industry are broken down for rating
purposes into approximately seven hundred classes (manual classifications) and that the rate for each class is fixed by a statistical
process resulting in the so-called manual classification gross rate.
95. Of course, spokesmen f.r labor have also correctly insisted that
high compensation insurance costs unduly depress the benefit levels.
96. For a description of preient rating techniques see Kulp, The Rate
Making Process in Property and Casualty Insura.,e-Goals, Techniques
and Limits, 15 Law & Contemp. Prob. 493 (1950); Riesenfeld & Maxwell,
op. cit. supra.note 13, at 375 (with further references).
97. The cooperation began with the establishment of the Council, on
the suggestion of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners,
in 1921.
98. The revised rating procedure to be followed in current rate revisions
was approved by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners in
1943, see Proc. of the 74th Ann. Sess. of the NAIC 142 (1943). It
was modified in 1948 by the introduction of a Rate Level Adjustment Factor
designed to compensate for the inevitable lag of the rating base--predicated
on past policy year experience-behind the most recent calendar year experience, see Proc. of the 80th Anni. Sess. of NAIC 220 (1949) in conjunction
with Proc. of the 79th Ann. Sass. of NAIC 432 (1948). Recently the
NAIC has investigated the modification of the rating procedure by introduction of an Underwriting Profit and Contingency Factor and of Expense
Constants for Smaller Risks. The NAIC has indorsed the insertion of both
items into the rate-making process, but has not made a definite recommendation either of a percentage to be uniformly allowed for profit and contingencies or of a fixed amount for the expense constant and of the risk size to
which it applies, see Proc. of the 81st Ann. Sess. of NAIC 539 (1951) and
Proc. of the 82nd Ann. Sess. of NAIC 382ff., especially 393, 416, 421 (1951),

19521

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION

This rate then is adjusted to the individual risk of the insurance
buyer by authorized standard types of merit rating plans. Each
manual classification gross rate is composed of two main parts
called "pure premium" and "expense loading."
The income from the pure premium portion of the total sums
collected is statistically, expected to produce the amounts necessary
for the payments of claims. The income from the expense loading portion conversely is designed to take care of underwriting
expenses and underwriting profit.
If the rating process were flawless the amounts corresponding to
the pure premium portion of the rates would not produce any significant errors per year or, at least, cancel out over reasonable periods.
The truth, however, is that since the end of the depression the total
income from the pure premium part of the rates have consistently
exceeded the amounts actually expended in the payments of benefits
and produced a substantial excess profit for the industry as a
whole.0w The explanation of this failure of the rating process lies
chiefly in the combination of two factors, namely (a) that the
premium base is the total payroll of the employer and that this has
risen faster than the benefit levels, and (b) that the standard rating
process was based until 1948 upon past policy year experience and
has ignored the most recent past experience in the rate-making
process.Y00 To cure the latter defect a special Rate Level Adjustment Factor was introduced in 1949 into the accepted procedure,"0 " but experience with it is still too short to evaluate its
effects. It would perhaps be preferable to find means by which
the industry is legally compelled to return an unreasonable large
profit from shortcomings of the rating process to the insurance
buyers. To be sure, even today many carriers, also when operating
as stock companies, write participating policies, but this practice
99. In Minnesota, for instance, since the policy year 1933 the actual
loss ratio has been consistently and substantially lower than the permissible
loss ratio. The aggregate of the incurred losses for the premium years 19331948 amounted only to $64,926,363, while the aggregate of the statistically
expected losses for that period amounted to $79,346,659. Consequently the
statistical error amounted to 18.5%. See Minn. Compensation Board, 14th
Bienn. Rep. 22 (1950). To properly evaluate the implications of these
figures it must, of course, be realized that the carriers do not necessarily
collect the premiums at the manual gross rates but make adjustments under
the various approved merit and retroactive rating plans. Nevertheless the
error seems to indicate a more than potential source for excess profits at
the expense of insurance buyers.
100. See, especially, Proc. of the 77th Ann. Sess. of NAIC 438 (1946)
and Riesenfeld & Maxwell, op. cit. mspra note 13, at 376 n. 35.
101. See note 98 sipra.
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provides neither uniform nor necessarily adequate protection for
the insurance buyers.
Another criticism is directed against the expense loading factor.
Expense loading, as now widely in use, provides for 2.5% for underwriting profit and contingency and 40%7 for actual expenses. 1 '
This means that out of each premium dollar (at manual gross rates)
42.5 cents are designed by the rate-making process to be used for the
operation of the system and not the payment of benefits. This is
at first blush a startling amount. It is, however, explained as the
figure which rating authorities ought to allow, in view of the following breakdown, based on the average operating expenses incucurred by carriers organized on the stock principle: Aquisition
Costs, i.e., commissions and brokerage fees (17.5%); Taxes
(2.5%).; Profits and Contingency (2.5%); Claim Adjustment
(8%o); Administration and Audit (9.5%o) ; Inspections (2.5%). 1'
National expense exhibits by stock carriers generally substantiate
these claims.10 4 Interestingly enough the corresponding figures by
non-stock companies show much lower operating expenses (around
25%), chiefly due to the fact: that these companies engage generally in direct writing, i.e., incur no brokerage expenses, and also
operate at lower loss adjustment expenses., 5 State funds are managed at even lower overhead, in California, for instance, at approximately 157. 1' 6
The soundness of the "principle" that the experience of the
type of compensation insurance carrier with the highest operating
cost should determine the expense loading factor 1 7 is not neces102. The figures given in the text are the ones now most widely employed. A number of states, however, have refused to accept the profit and
contingency factor or permit only a slightly lesser amount for the remaining
part of expense loading. Minnesota, for instance, has granted only 39% for
actual expenses in recent rate revisions, see Minn. Compensation Insurance
Bd., 14th Bienn. Rep. 13, 14 (1950).

103. See the table submitted in a report by the National Council on

Compensation Insurance to a special committee of the NAIC and reprinted in
Proc. of the 82nd Ann. Sess. of the NAIC 395, at 399 (1951).

104. See, for instance, the casualty experience exhibits for 1948 and
1949 reproduced in Minn. Compensation Insurance Bd., 14th Bienn. Rep.

20, 21 (1950).
105. See the pertinent data reproduced in Minn. Compensation Insurance Bd., 14th Bienn. Rep. 20, 21 (1950).
106. See Cal. Assembly Interim Committee on Finance and Insurance
(3rd extra Sess. 1950), 2d Prelim. Rep. of Workmen's Compensation Insurance 27 (1950).
107. For assertions of this principle see, for instance, the statement by
the California Insurance Commissioner of March 1, 1950, reprinted op. cit.
supra note 106, at 30, or the sta-:ement by the National Council on Compensation Insurance of March 16, 1951, reprinted in Proc. of the 82nd Ann.
Sess. of the NAIC 395 (1951).
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sadly self-evident. However, it must be recognized that the relative
costs of different systems in themselves are not completely reliable measures of their efficiency. Actually the Director of the
W\Tashington Department of Labor and Industries in reporting on
the operations of the Washington State Fund himself has commented "on the lower quality of service rendered by the State in
comparison with private companies."'' 10 Statistics also seem to prove
that the average size of the risk underwritten by the direct writing
companies is larger than that underwritten by the stock companies operating through agents, 109 which signifies that the latter
type of carrier renders more effective services in policing the system against non-insurers. Whether this virtue by itself suffices
to justify the great extra cost is basically more a question of politics
than economics.
Lately the National Association of Insurance Commissioners
instigated the undertaking of industry studies regarding the
"graduation of expenses by size of risk."" 0 The data thus obtained
revealed that underwriting expenses vary distinctly with the
size of the risk, increasing sharply with small policies. As a result
the Association concluded that the practice of applying a uniform
expense loading factor to all manual rates produced inadequate expense provisions for small risks and excessive amounts for large
policies. "i ll It endorsed therefore the introduction into the rating
process of expense constants payable by the buyer of smaller
policies and a simultaneous commensurate reduction of the overall loading factor. While this idea that each insurance buyer should
bear his "true" share of the underwriting expense possesses the
appearance of fairness, the social wisdom of it is therefore by no
means unquestionable. Since the whole system of workmen's
compensation insurance is compulsory and part of a social insurance scheme there might be persuasive reasons which militate
against a differentiation between small and big enterprises. In addition, by the same logic, a differentiation of expense costs according
108. Wash. Dept. of Labor and Industries, llth Ann. Rep. 32 (1948).
109. In New York during the policy year of 1948 the stock companies.
wrote 246,569 policies earning $80,219,379 (average $326) while the mutuals
wrote 65,592 policies earning $66,817,378 (average $1,018), N. Y. Compensation Insurance Rating Board, 37th Ann. Rep. Exhibit 3 (1951).
110. See especially, Proc. of the 80th Ann. Sess. of the NAIC 137, 470
(1949) ; Proc. of the 81st Ann. Sess. of the NAIC 515 (1950) ; Proc. of the
82nd Ann. Sess. of the NAIC 382, 391, 393 (1951).
111. See especially the report by the Special Subcommittee of the Workmen's Compensation Committee of the NAIC, Proc. of the 82nd Ann. Sess. of

NAIC 391 (1951).
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to occupational classifications and types of carriers would seem to
become just as much a command of fairness. Perhaps greater than
the need for a redistribution of the underwriting costs among the
insurance buyers is that for an insistence by the rating authority
on an improved overall efficiency of the carriers considering the
expense distribution in the particular state.
V.

CONCLUSION

The foregoing survey indicates, in the opinion of the writer,
that the present status of workmen's compensation in the United
States is far from being ideal and that the system is ripe for an
extensive job of overhauling. Especially three basic shortcomings
require attention:
1) Benefit structures and levels need urgent revisions as to adequacy, equity and consistency. They show great defects as the result of over-standardization and confused bases of disability as well
as unrealistic amounts and outdated, inappropriate and inflexible
ceilings.
2) The administration of the system should be improved as to
the methods of disability rating and by increased emphasis on rehabilitation.
3) The costs of the system should be minimized by returning excessive profits resulting from shortcomings of the rating process
to the insurance buyers and by reviewing apparently overgenerous
allowances for claim adjustment and underwriting expenses.
There is no doubt that the standards aimed at are not easily attained, but the sound social aims of the program justify fullest attention to its improvement by the legislatures.

